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Abstract 
 
This study examines the relationship between on-the-job training and job performance 
among 3,408 telephone operators in a large unionized telecommunications company.   We 
utilize individual data on monthly training hours and job performance over a five-month period 
as provided by the company’s electronic monitoring system.  Results indicate that the receipt of 
on-the-job training is associated with significantly higher productivity over time, when 
unobserved individual heterogeneity is taken into account.  Moreover, workers with lower pre-
training proficiency show greater improvements over time than those with higher pre-training 
proficiency.  Finally, whether the training is provided by a supervisor or a peer also matters.  
Workers with lower proficiency achieve greater productivity gains through supervisor training, 
while workers with higher proficiency achieve greater productivity gains through peer training. 
 
 
 
 
 
*Xiangmin Liu is a Ph.D. student in Human Resource Studies at the ILR School, Cornell 
University.   Rosemary Batt is the Alice H. Cook Professor of Women and Work, ILR School, 
387 Ives Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853, 607-254-4437 (phone), 607-255-1836 (fax), 
rb41@cornell.edu.  This study was funded by the Russell Sage Foundation.  Copies of the 
computer programs used to generate the results in this paper are available through Rosemary 
Batt at the address above. 
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Introduction 
In recent decades, skill requirements for many jobs have increased due to heightened 
international competition, technological change, and customer expectations (Osterman 1995; 
Cappelli et al. 1997).  Employers who are investing in new work processes and technology 
expect workers to produce error-free output at higher levels of efficiency than in the past.  Thus, 
the need for on-going training has risen even though competitive pressures put constraints on 
training budgets.   
On-the-job training (OJT) provides an effective and efficient way to satisfy the demand for 
skill in organizations characterized by continuous change in technology and competition.  First, 
it allows new employees to acquire firm-specific skills and knowledge that are hard to obtain in 
the market, while allowing incumbent employees to stay abreast of changes in technical 
systems and product offerings.  Second, it may be more effective than classroom training 
because employees learn through continuous, context-situated learning initiatives, rather than 
via infrequent or isolated training activities (Sugrue 2003).  Context-specific learning also 
reduces the losses associated with transferring learning from off-site to on-site applications.  
Third, compared to formal classroom training, on-the-job training is less costly because it 
reduces productivity loss associated with time away from work and it saves expenditures 
associated with training specialists and materials.  Because it can be integrated into daily work 
schedules, it also provides greater flexibility than traditional, off-the-job training.  In sum, on-the-
job training can yield substantial economic pay-offs to companies through the on-going skill 
acquisition of employees.  Yet, the overwhelming bulk of training research has focused on 
formal classroom training (Bishop 1997; Frazis and Loewenstein 2003).   
The present study contributes to the training literature in several ways.  First, we focus on 
an important, but relatively neglected subject in the training literature -- on-the-job training rather 
than formal training, and incumbent workers rather than new hires.  Second, we develop and 
test a model of productivity that disaggregates the effects of prior training (the accumulated 
The Economic Pay-Offs                                                      CAHRS WP05-11 
 
Page 5 
‘stock’ of training) from those of current training (what we refer to as the ‘flow’ of training).  Most 
prior studies have failed take into account the effects of skill accumulation; and some 
researchers have emphasized the need for longitudinal studies that differentiate the returns to 
prior and current training (e.g., Black and Lynch 1996).  
Third, we use archival data from a firm-level computerized monitoring system to measure 
on-the-job training hours and productivity for individual employees.  Relatively few studies have 
estimated rates of return to on-the-job training due in part to the difficulty of measuring it.  The 
longitudinal nature of the data enables us to use fixed effects models to control for unmeasured 
individual heterogeneity and to disaggregate the effects of accumulated versus current training. 
Fourth, we integrate insights from organizational behavior to conceptualize how organizational 
contingencies and individual differences in employees and trainers affect training outcomes.  
That is, we examine how employees with different levels of capability respond to training in 
general and to supervisor versus peer trainers in particular.   
Finally, we focus on training in routine service jobs, specifically directory assistance 
telephone operators.  While automation has increasingly eliminated clerical jobs like these (Levy 
and Murnane 2004), routine service work is still abundant in the economy.  More importantly, we 
chose this context as a critical case.  Conventional wisdom is that such routinized and 
technology-driven work requires little skill, and investments in training are unlikely to have 
meaningful productivity effects.  If on-the-job training has economic pay-offs in this context, it is 
likely to have more benefits for jobs with greater skill requirements and opportunities for 
independent judgment.  
The organization of this paper is as follows.  In Section 2, we review prior literature on the 
relationship between training and productivity, and we develop our hypotheses.  After 
discussing the data set and econometric specifications in Section 3, we present empirical 
results in Section 4 and calculate return on investment.  The final section discusses the 
implications of our findings. 
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Research on Training and Productivity 
The theoretical argument linking employer-provided training to performance is well 
established.  Human capital theory distinguishes between general training and firm-specific 
training, with the former focused on improving human capital that is portable across firms and 
the latter designed to increase the skills of employees in a particular firm (Becker 1962).  The 
theory predicts that employers will invest in firm-specific training because it increases marginal 
benefits and reduces the probability of inter-firm mobility.  Moreover, it assumes that 
investments in workers’ capacities are comparable to those for other resources in the production 
process, with investments in an initial period assumed to generate returns in subsequent 
periods.  Firms decide how much to invest in training by calculating the net present value of the 
costs and benefits of such a decision (Stevens 1994; Loewenstein and Spletzer 1999b).   
Prior research has categorized firm-specific training into two types: formal training and 
informal or on-the-job training.  Formal training typically includes a standardized curriculum 
provided by an instructor away from the job, although companies are increasingly delivering 
formal training through computer-based programs.  On-the-job training occurs in the context of 
daily work and has been defined to include three types: a) time spent watching co-workers do 
the job; b) time spent in individualized training or feedback with supervisors at work; and c) time 
spent in individualized training or feedback with co-workers at work (Employment Opportunities 
Pilot Program, 1979-80).  The current study focuses on the latter two types of training. 
Most empirical research to date has focused on formal rather than on-the-job training.  
While an estimated two-thirds of the U.S. workforce receives on-the-job training (Altonji and 
Spletzer 1991; Frazis et al. 1998), much prior research has focused on employer-sponsored 
formal training for managers and professionals (e.g., Mathieu and Leonard 1987; Bartel 1995) 
or on public training programs for the unemployed and disadvantaged (e.g., Courty and 
Marschke 1997; Greenberg, Michalopoulos, and Robins 2003).  Moreover, many studies have 
The Economic Pay-Offs                                                      CAHRS WP05-11 
 
Page 7 
relied on wage growth, mobility, or self reports of productivity to estimate the outcomes of 
training (e.g., Mincer 1988; Lynch 1992; Parent 1999; Loewenstein and Spletzer 1999).  
Here, we review studies of training and actual performance, which are of two types: 
large-sample surveys and econometric case studies (Bartel 2000).   Studies of formal training 
using large sample survey data have yielded positive, but inconclusive results (Holzer et al. 
1993; Bartel 1994; Black and Lynch 1996; and Barrett and O’Connell 2001).  Holzer et al. 
(1993), for example, used a three-year panel of data from the Michigan Job Opportunities Bank 
Upgrade project (MJOB), a state-financed training grant program for small manufacturing firms 
in the process of implementing new technology.  Holzer and his colleagues found that a 
doubling of the amount of formal training per employee reduced the output scrap rate by about 7 
percent, but lasting effects of training were not significant and there was little effect of training 
on sales or wages.  Bartel (1994) examined productivity gains from formal training in large 
manufacturing companies.  She found that some businesses that were operating below their 
expected productivity levels in 1983 implemented training programs after 1983.  Higher 
productivity growth rates due to training programs brought these businesses up to the 
productivity levels of comparable businesses by 1986.   
Black and Lynch (1996, 2001) utilized data from the National Center on the Educational 
Quality of the Workforce National Employers Survey (EQW-NES).  They found that the 
percentage of training that occurred off-the-job was significantly positively associated with 
productivity in manufacturing companies, and computer training had a positive impact in non-
manufacturing companies.   However, neither the total number of employees trained in a prior 
period nor the number trained in the current period had a significant relationship to sales, based 
on cross-sectional estimations (Black and Lynch 1996).  Finally, the authors suggested that it 
was not so much whether the employer trained workers, but rather how training was actually 
implemented, that affected productivity (Black and Lynch 2001).  Barrett and O’Connell (2001) 
also reached mixed conclusions in their survey of formal vocational training among 215 Irish 
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companies.  Results were sensitive to how training was measured as well as the type of training 
offered.   General training had positive effects while specific training did not.  
The second approach to research on employer-provided training, which is applied in this 
paper, is to conduct a detailed firm-level study of training and its effectiveness. This strategy, 
which substantially reduces measurement error and bias caused by unobserved heterogeneity, 
is exemplified in recent work by Bartel (1995) and Krueger and Rouse (1998).  Among 
professional employees in a large manufacturing company, Bartel (1995) found that one-day 
participation in formal training programs increased wages by 1.8 percent, and employees who 
received training also experienced significant increases in their subjective performance ratings.  
Krueger and Rouse (1998) examined a workplace education program at two mid-sized 
companies in manufacturing and services.  On-site classroom courses, designed to improve 
basic skills for low skilled workers, produced mixed results.  In the manufacturing setting, trained 
workers were more likely to bid for new jobs and to receive upgrades than comparable non-
participants.  In the service company, however, training participants were not different from non-
participants except on the measure of self-reported job performance. These findings were 
particularly robust because biases due to non-random selection into training were controlled for. 
As suggested by Bartel (1995), for example, training can be either “career advancement” or 
“remedial.” In a career advancement situation, workers selected to receive more training are 
likely to be more capable workers than their peers, irrespective of the amount of training they 
receive. Estimation of training effects is therefore upward biased as it may simply reflect 
selection into training, rather than human capital accumulation and utilization.  By contrast, less 
capable workers are likely to receive remedial training so that estimates of the returns to training 
should be downward biased. .  
In contrast to the research on formal training, only a handful of studies have examined 
on-the-job training, and these have used national level surveys (Bishop 1991; Barron, Berger, 
and Black 1997a, 1997b).  Most prior studies have used either job tenure as a proxy for informal 
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training or self-reported estimates of training hours in national surveys, both of which are subject 
to serious measurement error (Loewenstein and Spletzer 1999a; Barron, Berger and Black 
1997a).  Moreover, while on-the-job training for incumbent workers has grown in response to 
changing technologies and work processes, existing studies of on-the-job training have tended 
to examine workers in the first three months of being hired (Bishop 1991; Barron, Berger, and 
Black 1997b).  
Bishop’s (1991) study analyzing the 1982 Employment Opportunity Pilot Projects 
(EOPP) included formal training and three types of on-the-job training: learning by watching, 
informal training with supervisors, and informal training with co-workers.  Bishop found that the 
marginal rate of return for 100 hours of training ranged from 11 to 38 percent, depending on 
estimation techniques and type of training.  Moreover, the amount of formal and informal 
training had very similar effects on productivity growth during the first year of employment.  This 
implies that informal training, which is lower in cost than formal training, had higher marginal 
returns. In a second study, Bishop (1994) found that employer training raised both wages and 
productivity.  Investments in training appeared profitable for employers because productivity 
gains were greater than wage growth.  
Barron, Berger, and Black (1997b) also investigated the effects of on-the-job training on 
wages, turnover, and productivity using three different data sources: the EOPP 1982 data, a 
1992 Small Business Administration survey, and their own 1993 survey sponsored by the 
UpJohn Institute.  Their findings are similar to those of Bishop regarding the value of on-the-job 
training.  They also demonstrated the extent of measurement error in national training surveys 
by comparing differences in training measures across surveys and by comparing matched-pairs 
of responses of workers and employers on the extent of training (Barron, Berger, and Black 
1997a).    
These studies based on national survey data provide the strongest evidence to date that 
on-the-job training has economic benefits.  However, they have several methodological 
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problems. First, they rely on retrospective data; but as Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999) note, 
measurement error increases with the span of time between the training spell and the interview.  
Second, the survey reports by employers and employees vary considerably.  Barron, Berger, 
and Black (1997a), for example, found that the correlation between worker and establishment 
measures of training was less than 0.5, with employers usually reporting 25 percent more hours 
of training on average than workers.  Third, productivity is reported by employers on a 
subjective scale.  Fourth, training and job performance are almost inherently heterogeneous, so 
that it is inappropriate to aggregate between firms and industries (Bartel 1995).   
In sum, human capital theory provides a general argument for why investments in 
training should lead to better performance via its effect on human capital.  However, empirical 
studies provide inconsistent results, in part due to the measurement limitations of national 
survey data.   Moreover, aside from the general proposition that investment in firm-specific 
training should improve performance, economic theory provides little guidance for theorizing 
about how, why, or under what conditions on-the job training may have differentiated outcomes. 
On-the-Job Training as Information Processing and Continuous Learning 
To improve our understanding and empirical estimation of how on-the-job training affects 
productivity, we go beyond the model of discrete, isolated investments in human capital.  We 
believe it is more useful to conceptualize on-the-job training as a process of continuous learning, 
or the on-going accumulation of human capital at work.  The returns to on-the-job training, in 
this view, include two dimensions: the ‘stock’ of training benefits that accumulates over time and 
the ‘flow’ of current training benefits that may be immediately applied to work activities.  This 
approach provides a more precise estimate of how training affects productivity over time.  We 
present this conceptualization mathematically in the model specifications below.   
In addition, we examine variation in organizational contingencies that may shape the 
effectiveness of training.  Two important factors concern the level of proficiency of workers and 
the level of complexity of tasks.  According to Ackerman (1987), the effectiveness of training for 
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employees with different levels of ability depends importantly on the level of information 
processing that tasks require.  For novel tasks requiring sophisticated information processing, 
he found that individuals with high levels of intellectual capability gained more from training than 
did those with lower capabilities.  Training in these circumstances will tend to accentuate the 
differences between employees with higher and lower intellectual capabilities.  This line of 
argument is consistent with the findings in much of the economics literature that higher 
educated workers are more likely to receive formal training and are more likely to benefit from 
such training (e.g., Frazis, Hertz, and Horrigan 1995; Bartel 1995; Bishop 1997).   
By contrast, for tasks requiring simple and consistent information processing, Ackerman 
found that the relationship between training and performance was influenced more by 
psychomotor differences (e.g., speed of encoding or responding) than by general cognitive 
abilities. With sufficient training and practice, trainees in his study internalized task behaviors 
and the performance levels of the less proficient and more proficient gradually converged.  
Thus, in the context of relatively simple information processing – as that found in this study and 
in most routine service work -- on-the-job training should lead to a convergence of individual 
performance differences, with less proficient workers should show greater improvement than the 
more proficient for the same amount of training. 
Beyond the issue of individual tasks and competencies is the question of how the 
interactions between different types of trainers and employees affect outcomes.  The recent 
research on situated learning provides some direction here, as it conceptualizes learning as a 
social process (Lave and Wenger 1991; McLelland 1995).  From this perspective, learning is 
contextually bounded and influenced by the activity, context, and social relationships in which it 
is situated.  By extension, on-the-job training constitutes an example of situated learning in 
which the learner, the supervisor, and other workers influence the process and outcomes (Lave 
and Wenger 1991; Brown and Duguid 1991).  More specifically, because on-the-job training 
occurs in the context of daily work routines and practices, it typically does not include the kind of 
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pre-determined curriculum found in formal training.  Its effectiveness depends importantly on the 
characteristics, choices, and capabilities of the learner and the trainer; differences in status or 
power between the trainer and trainee; and how these factors interact.  A common and 
important distinction in this regard is whether trainers are supervisors or experienced co-
workers.   
Prior research shows that supervisors typically take a quite different approach to training 
than do peer trainers.  Supervisors usually take a relatively structured approach to training, 
using company manuals, standardized training materials, and follow-up observations.  They 
transform on-the-job training into a more standardized set of learning activities.  Swanson, 
O’Connor, and Cooney (1990) suggested that low-ability learners tend to gain more from high-
structured learning environments than do high-ability learners.  Also, the supervisor influences a 
worker’s effort through disciplinary authority as less proficient workers are more likely to be 
subject to reprimand and corrective feedback than the more proficient.  As a result, they are 
likely to increase their effort to avoid punishment.  This line of reasoning suggests that 
supervisors are likely to be more effective than peer trainers in training less proficient workers.  
In other words, supervisor-provided training should result in larger performance gains for less-
proficient workers than for more-proficient workers.  
Peer trainers, by contrast, are experienced workers who provide assistance and share 
knowledge with co-workers through informal instructional activities.  They are the ‘subject 
experts’ in the workplace.  They accumulate tacit knowledge of work processes through day-to-
day practices, and therefore possess significant knowledge of idiosyncratic job characteristics, 
which supervisors often do not have.  Particularly in the current environment of rapidly changing 
work processes and technologies, even supervisors who have been promoted from production 
level jobs experience rapid decay in the relevance of their accumulated tacit knowledge.   
In addition, training with peers is a social influence process through which workers learn to 
conform to the norms and customs of the social group (Bandura 1977).  Workers are likely to be 
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position does not carry any disciplinary authority.  Trust facilitates cooperation, and where 
unions are present, solidaristic behavior among co-workers is likely to be stronger.  Doeringer 
and Piore (1971) provided similar arguments in their analysis of internal labor markets and 
customary norms that shaped skill acquisition between more and less experienced workers. 
This line of reasoning also echoes Sisson’s (2001) argument that peer trainers are competent to 
the extent that they rely on their own job experience while supervisor trainers are competent to 
the extent that they rely on company manuals. 
However, there are limitations to the effectiveness of peer training because it is incidental 
and emergent in nature, and may even be inconsistent across work shifts or trainers.  
Therefore, those workers who already have a good command of job-related knowledge and 
skills are more likely to benefit from peer-provided training than those with less job proficiency.   
 To summarize our arguments, we expect that on-the-job training will be associated with 
better performance, both through the immediate effects on the flow of human capital as well as 
the cumulative effects on the stock of human capital.  In addition, because this study focuses on 
routine information processing tasks, we expect that the benefits of on-the-job training and 
performance will be stronger for workers with lower levels of proficiency than for workers with 
higher proficiency.  Finally, we expect that the interactions between different types of trainers 
and trainees will produce differentiated results, with supervisor training more effective for less 
proficient workers and peer training more effective for more proficient workers.  
Model Specification 
We begin by assuming that job performance is a function of human capital and worker 
characteristics.  The performance equation for worker i at time period t is 
itiitit XHCPERF εδβα +⋅++⋅+=    (1) 
where PERF it is worker i’s job performance at time t, as measured by CHT and PCT_CHT, 
HCit is the accumulation of human capital of worker i at time t, β represents the effects of HCi on 
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performance, and Xi is a vector of control variables assumed to affect performance with the 
current employer; εit is the error term that is assumed to be normal.  This specification highlights 
the key argument of human capital theory that more investment in human capital leads to better 
performance. 
We incorporate several modifications to address some neglected characteristics of on-the-
job training.  Because on-the-job training is not the only way that workers acquire human capital 
to adequately perform their job, we take into account the amount of human capital accumulated 
prior to training.  Initial human capital stock (HC0) represents the stock of human capital that a 
worker accumulates prior to the period of observation.  Moreover, conventional econometric 
models consider the investment in human capital and its returns as a discrete, two-stage model.  
These models do not allow for the simultaneity of learning and production, as is the case in on-
the-job training.  Therefore, we decompose investments in on-the-job training into two 
components: on-the-job training accumulated prior to time period t and on-the-job training 
accumulated during time period t.  Investment in on-the-job training thus contributes to worker 
productivity through two mechanisms: either as a portion of accumulated human capital stock 
(as estimated by β) or as an incremental flow to human capital (as estimated by γ).  In addition, 
often a readjustment period is required before a worker fully applies his or her newly learned 
skills on the job.  To allow for these adjustments and the possible lag between investments and 
benefits, we expect that the effect of existing stock of human capital (β) will outweigh that of 
 (γ). The presence of a union in the company, as well as skill specificity through on-the-job 
training, considerably reduces the propensity to quit.  We assume that workers do not leave 
their jobs (in fact, turnover in the real company was two percent annually) and that the stock of 
human capital is non-decreasing in the model.  Thus, we extend the specification of a worker’s 
job performance as follows:  
itOJT
itiititioit XOJTFLWOJTSTKHCPERF εδγββα +⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+= __    (2) 
 
Page 14 
The Economic Pay-Offs                                                      CAHRS WP05-11 
where  (3) ∑−
=
=
1
0
__
t
k
ikit OJTFLWOJTSTK β
           θβγ ⋅=  (4) 
Furthermore, we use a fixed effects model to correct for time-invariant unobserved 
individual heterogeneity.  Consider 
itiit νµε +=    (5) 
where, µi represents unobservable person-specific characteristics affecting performance, 
and νit is a zero mean error term, independent of training variables.  
Equation (2) is thus equivalently transformed as 
itiiititioit XOJTFLWOJTSTKHCPERF νµδγββα ++⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+= __    (6) 
Data 
Research Strategy and Sample 
The research site for this study is the telephone operator services division of a large 
unionized telecommunications company operating in a multi-state region of the United States.  
The focal occupational group (telephone operators) is the largest group of non-managerial 
employees in the business.  The strategy of focusing on one occupational group in one 
company (Batt 2002) reduces confounding error caused by factors such as business and 
human resource strategy, technology, selection criteria, and work processes.  The presence of 
the union further standardizes such practices as pay rates, job posting and bidding, and 
grievance procedures across the multi-state area.   
Our field research provided insights into business operations, competitive pressures, the 
skill requirements of jobs, and how and why on-the-job training might be useful in this context.  
The business in this case handles directory assistance inquiries from anywhere in the United 
States.  Government-mandated service levels require the company to answer 97.5 percent of 
calls in 6 seconds.  In addition, cost competition is intense in this commodity business, and 
companies can save millions of dollars by reducing call handling time by fractions of seconds.  
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This can be accomplished either through new technologies (for example, voice recognition 
systems now process portions of each call) or better work skills (e.g., more efficient search 
strategies).  The company also requires an 85 percent customer satisfaction rating, as 
measured by an outside vendor survey. 
High levels of automation allow operators to handle over 1,000 calls per day, with an 
average call handling time (the average time to complete a call) of 21.37 seconds (based on our 
archival data).  As soon as one call has ended, a second one enters the operator’s headset.  
These jobs are highly stressful, according to industry analysts and managers interviewed for this 
study. 
The knowledge and skill requirements of the job are of four types: a) basic keyboarding, 
b) technical and procedural knowledge, c) social interaction skills, and d) substantive 
knowledge.   According to our interviews, initial training focuses on the first two areas, ensuring 
that new hires have accurate and efficient keyboarding skills and know the procedures for 
retrieving information from a variety of databases.  The company provides an average of 2.1 
weeks of initial training; and it takes employees about six months to become proficient on the 
job, according to our survey of a stratified random sample of 773 workers and their supervisors.    
The company engages in several types of on-the-job training activities, including training 
in methods (new procedures), customer satisfaction (better ways to improve service quality), 
district issues (business-specific information), ergonomics, and performance feedback.  The 
majority of the training is devoted to monthly performance feedback, with a supervisor or peer 
trainer providing individualized instruction after listening remotely to several of the employee’s 
calls (typically 20 calls for business, residential, and government sectors).  The employee is 
rated on efficiency standards such as: initial start time of less than 4 seconds; number of 
searches per call less than 2.5; operator report time (scanning, giving options) less than 12 
seconds; release to audio at least 87 percent of time (having the system give the number rather 
than the operator reading it).   Service quality is measured by such items as tone of voice, 
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listening and answering questions accurately, and degree of professionalism.  Substantive 
knowledge is captured by the percentage of calls transferred to a more experienced operator 
(service assistant), which can be no more than 3 percent.  In sum, these customized sessions 
provide specific guidance for improvement.  
A second type of on-the-job training is methods training, which focuses on new 
procedures for call handling, information processing, or updates in the information database: 
these types of changes are not uncommon as companies continually search for ways to 
improve work processes.  In our survey of supervisors, they reported that operators received an 
average of 6.7 emails per day on updates or new procedures.  They also reported that service 
options, features, and pricing were updated ‘sometimes’ to ‘often’ (2.5 on a Likert scale of 1-5).  
For example, prior our fieldwork, the company had recently moved to providing National 411 
service (as opposed to regional service only), which was an important source of new revenues, 
but which required operators to learn an entire new database system.  The efficient handling of 
calls depends not only on technical procedural knowledge but on whether the operator has tacit 
knowledge of local terminology or names of businesses that diverge from how they are officially 
listed in information databases.  In sum, in what is often considered a relatively low-skilled 
routine clerical job, there are on-going changes in information systems and work processes that 
require regular attention to on-the-job training. 
Variation in training practices in this study derives largely from variation in managerial 
implementation of corporate policies.  For example, the company set a policy that all 
supervisors must observe at least 70 percent of their employees each month, yet in one site we 
visited, the manager admitted that they were only observing 36 percent.  Thus, managers varied 
substantially in whether they achieved that goal, depending on staffing levels, resources, or their 
own managerial competence.   In addition, these managers had some discretion over their 
operational budgets: in our field interviews, for example, we found that some managers had 
decided to put more resources into on-going training than others. 
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The employee sample was drawn from the company’s Human Resource Information 
System (HRIS), which contained data on demographics (age, race, gender, company tenure), 
job title, work group location, supervisor, work site location, and wage rate.  We excluded 194 
new employees with less than six-months of employment because they were not rated using the 
same scale as employees beyond the six-month probation.  We also excluded centers with less 
than 40 employees.  The final sample includes 3,408 telephone operators at 48 service centers.  
Operators in our sample are primarily white (73 percent) and female (86 percent), with an 
average age of 41 and company tenure of 11 years.  The company hires high school graduates 
and uses two rounds of systematic testing in its selection procedures.   While the HRIS system 
did not provide educational data, our survey of employees showed that most have had some 
post-secondary education, but only eight percent have a four-year college degree.  The average 
supervisor in the sample is 44 years old and has served the company for about 20 years; the 
average peer trainer is 50 years old and has served for 22 years.  Seventy-six percent of 
supervisors are white and 83 percent of them are female, while 78 percent of peer trainers are 
white and 94 percent of them are female.  
Measures 
Measures of training and productivity come from the computerized monitoring system in 
the call centers, which continuously records the work activities of each operator, including time 
on-line with customers and off-line for training or other activities.  The monthly data in this study 
cover the period of January 2001 to May 2001.   Each time an employee logged off the 
computer for training, the minutes of training were recorded, along with whether the training was 
with a supervisor or peer trainer.  On-the-job training is the length of time that a worker spent in 
on-the-job training each month. The percentage of operators who received training each month 
ranged from 92.8 percent to 95.6 percent, with an average training time that ranged from 75 to 
94 minutes.  All employees except for 2 out of 3,408 received some training in this period.  
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When broken down by type of trainer, workers received an average of 59 minutes of on-the-job 
training with their supervisors and 17 minutes with peer trainers each month.  
We used two measures of productivity.  The first measure, call handling time (CHT), is the 
average number of seconds an operator spends on a customer call.  Lower call handling time 
equals higher productivity.  The second measure is the percentage of local official objectives 
met (PCT_CHT).  Because the customer base varies geographically, each center specifies its 
own objectives, setting the minimum requirements expected from a worker performing at a 
normal pace. PCT_CHT is defined as the objective set by the center for call handling time 
divided by the actual time spent handling a call.  Thus, if an employee handles a call in less time 
than the center’s objective, the employee scores higher than 100 percent of objectives met.  
The company set the range of acceptable performance between 94 and 107 percent.  Any 
operators who fell below 94 percent were rated unsatisfactory, and above 107 percent, 
excellent.   
To measure pre-training proficiency, we used an operator’s percentage of objectives met 
in the first month for which we had data (e.g., January).  We chose this measure instead of CHT 
to eliminate potential error confounded by establishment characteristics.  Using the company’s 
threshold criteria of 94 percent and 107 percent, we established three proficiency categories: 
low (761 workers, 22%); average (1,142 workers. 34%); and high (916 workers, 27%).  
Finally, we matched the training and productivity data to archival data from the company’s 
Human Resource Information System (HRIS).  Through our fixed-effects model, we controlled 
for age, sex, race, company tenure, and other time-invariant workers characteristics. 
Selection Bias 
Prior literature suggests that non-random selection into training may seriously bias the 
estimation of returns to training.  Drawing upon prior research and company information, we did 
a number of analyses to assess the extent of selection bias in this study.  First, we found that 
the distribution of training is widespread: over the five months of data, only 2 workers out of 
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3,408 received no training.  On a month-by-month basis, the percentage of workers who 
received some training ranged from 92.8% to 95.6% of workers. We ran a random effects probit 
analysis to test whether performance in month 1 was a significant predictor of whether an 
employee received any training in a given month, and we found no significant effect.   
We then assessed variation in hours of training received (see Appendix 1).  Controlling 
for supervisor and worker demographic characteristics, we found that workers with lower 
performance ratings in month 1 received significantly longer hours of total training.  This 
confirmed the need to run separate analyses by proficiency group (low, average, and high) as 
describe above.  The lowest proficiency group received an average of 1 hour and 44 minutes 
(1.54 SD) of OJT each month, while the average proficiency group received 1 hour and 28 
minutes (1.53 SD), and the high proficiency group, 1 hour and 19 minutes (1.33 SD).  Thus, the 
lowest proficiency group received an average of 16 minutes more training each month than the 
average group, and 25 minutes more than the high proficiency group.  While these differences 
are statistically significant, they would appear to be modest in magnitude.  Histograms of the 
distribution of training hours within each proficiency group also showed a narrow range of 
variability.   
In sum, these analyses show that there is a relatively even distribution of on-the-job 
training in our sample, which is consistent with findings in national surveys (Altonji and Spletzer 
1991).  In addition, there is negative selection into training in this sample, but it appears that the 
magnitude of variation in receipt of on-the-job training is small.  Nonetheless, our estimates of 
training benefits are biased downwards so that we present a conservative estimate of the 
returns to training.  
Results 
Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlation matrix for the major 
variables in the study.  Contrary to expectations, measures of accumulated and 
contemporaneous investments in on-the-job training are not significantly related to call handling 
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time.  In fact, the relationship between on-the-job training and the percentage of objectives met 
is significant and negative, which contradicts our expectations and suggests that further 
analyses are needed.  Some control variables have a statistically significant relationship with 
training outcomes.  White workers and younger workers are likely to be more productive, but 
sex is not statistically significant. 
Table 1:  
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlation Matrix 
 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1  
Call handling 
time 21.371 4.312          
2  
Percentage of 
local objective 
met 1.025 0.140 -0.766*         
3 
On-the-job 
training as stock 3.104 2.957 -0.023 -0.073*        
4  
On-the-job 
training as flow 1.248 1.434 0.011 -0.066* 0.133*       
5  Sex 0.868 0.339 0.010 -0.013 -0.044* -0.025      
6  Race 0.279 0.449 0.164* -0.087* 0.088* 0.078* 0.033*     
7  Age 40.799 11.252 0.282* -0.289* -0.083* -0.038* 0.164* 0.037*    
8  Tenure 11.425 10.156 0.300* -0.254* -0.090* -0.035* 0.174* 0.195* 
0.6720
* 
0.6720
*  
Note:   
1. Sex: dummy variable for sex with male=0 and female=1. 
2. Race: dummy variable for race with white=0 and nonwhite=1. 
3. Pairwise correlation with Bonferroni adjustment.
Training and Productivity  
Next, we provide a fixed effects estimation of the model by drawing on the longitudinal data.  A 
set of Hausman tests supports the use of fixed effects models over random effects models in 
this study.  In Tables 2 and 3, the first column presents the estimated relationship between on-
the-job training and productivity from fixed effects analyses.  The results support the argument 
that the amount of time spent in on-the-job training leads to productivity improvements both in 
the current month and the following months.  A positive and sustained return to training is line 
with some studies using fixed effects to control for individual heterogeneity (Bishop 1994; Bartel 
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1995).  The results show that one hour’s training is associated with a 0.06 second reduction 
(p<.01) in call handling time and a 0.07 percent improvement in the percentage of objectives 
met (p<.10) in the current month.  It is also related to a 0.05 second time reduction (p<.01) and 
a 0.11 percent objective improvement (p<.01) in the subsequent months.  Moreover, the pattern 
of standardized coefficients of STK_OJT and FLW_OJT is consistent with our expectation that a 
readjustment lag exists.  Lagged effects probably occur because as workers need time to 
transform what they have learned into automatic or unconscious behavior.  As a result, the 
standardized coefficient for productivity of on-the-job training is larger in subsequent months 
than in the current month. The pattern is particularly dramatic for the percentage of objectives 
met, where the lagged on-the-job training coefficient is approximately triple the magnitude of the 
coefficient for contemporaneous effects.  
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Table 2:  
Relationship between On-the-Job training and Call Handling Time (t-statistics included) 
 
 
All Workers  Workers of low pre-training proficiency  
Workers of average 
pre-training proficiency  
Workers of high 
pre-training proficiency 
 Coef.  Std. Beta  Coef.  Std. Beta  Coef.       Std. Beta Coef. Std. Beta
On-the-job 
training as 
stock 
-0.051              *** -0.035 *** -0.093 *** -0.064 *** -0.023 *** -0.016 *** -0.018 ** -0.013 **
 (-7.04)           
               
          
           
         
       
       
      
 (-5.95)   (-3.28)   (-2.48) 
On-the-job 
training as 
flow 
 
-0.061 *** -0.020 *** -0.096 *** -0.032 *** -0.019 * -0.006 * -0.001 0.000
(-4.99)  (-3.47)   (-1.78)   (-0.05) 
Constant 21.523  24.570   21.633   18.502 
No. of obs. 11,788 2,824 4,120 3,417
No. of 
persons 
 
3,298 761 1,142 916
F 31.58 20.78 6.15 3.23
 
Note: * Significant at 0.10, ** at 0.05, *** at 0.01. 
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Table 3: 
Relationship Between On-the-Job training and Percentage of Objectives Met 
 (t-statistics included) 
  All workers  Workers of low pre-training proficiency  
Workers of average 
pre-training 
proficiency 
 Workers of high pre-training proficiency 
 Coef.  Std. Beta  Coef.  Std. Beta  Coef.  Std. Beta     Coef. Std. Beta
On-the-job 
training as 
stock 0.001 ***            0.024** 0.002 ***
0.04
8 *** 0.001 0.011 -0.000 -0.006
      
 
(-5.23)  (6.22)  (1.61)    (-0.58)  
On-the-job 
training as 
flow 0.001*           
      
             
        
   
0.007 0.002 ***
0.01
7 *** 0.000 0.004
 
-0.001 -0.013
 (-1.90)  (2.53)  (0.85)   (-1.46)
Constant 1.022 0.886 1.006  1.170  
No. of obs. 11,788  2,824  4,120  3,417 
No. of 
persons 3,298 761 1142 916
F 14.10  20.47  1.48  1.09
Note: * Significant at 0.10, ** at 0.05, *** at 0.01.      
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To test for differences associated with pre-training proficiency, we performed a fixed 
effects estimation for each group of workers with different proficiency.  The analysis (columns 2-
4 of Tables 2 and 3) shows that workers with lower proficiency showed substantially higher 
performance gains related to training than did those with higher levels of proficiency.  For an 
average worker of low proficiency, one additional hour of on-the-job training is associated with a 
0.096 second reduction in call handling time (p<.01) in the current month, and a 0.093 second 
reduction (p<.01) in the subsequent months.  By contrast, for a typical worker of average 
proficiency, the same amount of training is associated with a reduction of only 0.02 seconds, 
either contemporaneously (p<.10) or subsequently (p<.01).  For workers with high proficiency, 
the relationships are weaker still.  One hour of training is associated with a 0.02 reduction in 
seconds per call (p<.05) in the months after training, and has no significant immediate effects.  
In other words, performance gains through training are primarily driven by the less proficient 
workers.  This pattern is more pronounced for the estimation of percentage of objectives met.  
Only the less proficient group shows significant productivity gains associated with training.  The 
coefficients on training for the other two groups are negligible and insignificant.  
These results raise the question of whether differences in effect sizes are partly due to 
regression to the mean.  However, our results reveal something more than that.  Descriptive 
statistics for each group showed different patterns of productivity improvements in each group 
over the five months.  While the productivity of the least proficient group increased over time, its 
variability became lower in the same time period.  
Supervisor Versus Peer Training  
Next we examine how variation in the training provider (supervisor versus peer) interacts 
with the level of proficiency of workers.  Tables 4 and 5 report these results.  For workers with 
lower levels of proficiency, training with the supervisor is associated with significantly higher 
productivity, as measured by call handling time and by percent of official objectives met.  By 
contrast, training with peer trainers is not significant.  For a typical worker in the less proficient 
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group, the receipt of one-hour’s training with a supervisor is associated with a 0.19 second 
reduction in call length (p<.01) in the current month and 0.13 seconds (p<.01) in the following 
months.  It is also associated with a 0.28% (p <.01) increase in the percentage of objectives met 
in the current and subsequent months.  The results support the idea that less proficient workers 
realize significant performance improvements from supervisor training, presumably because it is 
consistent, individualized, and extrinsically motivated.  Except for a small and significant lagged 
effect for highly proficient workers (-0.02, p<.01), supervisor training has no significant 
relationship with the performance of average and high proficiency workers. 
For workers with average levels of proficiency, it is the training with experienced peers 
that is significantly related to higher productivity, not training with supervisors.  Every a one-hour 
increase in peer training for this group is associated with a 0.04 seconds (p<.01) reduction call 
handling time in the current month and 0.06 seconds in the following months (p<.01).  The 
amount of training is also related to a higher percentage of objectives met (by 0.28% in 
subsequent months, p<.01).  These findings indicate that workers of average pre-training 
proficiency are more likely to benefit from peer training than supervisor training. Finally, 
probably because investments in training generate the least benefits to workers with high levels 
of competence, it does not seem to matter much whether training is delivered by supervisors or 
peers. 
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Table 4:  
Relationship between Supervisor Training, Peer Training, and Call Handling Time (t-statistics included) 
 
 
All workers 
Workers of low pre-
training proficiency 
Workers of average  
pre-training proficiency 
Workers of high pre-training 
proficiency 
 
Coef.     Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef.
 
Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. 
                
-0.048 *** 0.011 -0.135 *** 0.027  -0.012  0.009  -0.022 *** 0.011Supervisor 
on-the-job training 
as stock (-4.45)     
         
     
         
     
         
    
     
         
           
 (-4.97)  (-1.24)  (-2.06)
-0.083 *** 0.016 -0.191*** 0.048  -0.011  0.012  -0.012  0.018Supervisor on-the-
job training as flow  (-5.08)  (-3.96)  (-0.93)  (-0.68)
-0.065 *** 0.021 -0.035 0.040  -0.057 *** 0.022  -0.013  0.025 Peer on-the-job 
training as stock (-3.10)  (-0.88)  (-2.60)  (-0.52)
-0.034 * 0.020 -0.035 0.036 -0.045 *** 0.022 0.017 0.023Peer on-the-job 
training as flow (-1.68)  (-0.98)  (-2.04)  (0.75)
Constant 21.538 0.033 24.695 0.092 21.628 0.028 18.513 0.032
            
Number of obs 11,788 2,824 4,120 3,417 
Number of groups 3,274 761 1142 916 
 
Note: * Significant at 0.10, ** at 0.05, *** at 0.01. 
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Table 5:  
Relationship between Supervisor Training, Peer Training, and the Percentage of Objectives Met 
(t-statistics included) 
 
 
All workers 
Workers of low  
pre-training proficiency 
Workers of average  
pre-training proficiency 
Workers of high pre-
training proficiency 
 
Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef. 
 
Std. Err.   Coef. Std. Err.
           
0.001 *** 0.0003 0.0028*** 0.0006  -0.0002  0.0004  -0.0002  0.0007Supervisor 
on-the-job training 
as stock (2.38)        
        
        
        
        
        
       
          
(4.41) (-0.49) (-0.36)
 
0.001 *** 0.0005 0.0028*** 0.0011  0.0004  0.0006  -0.0004  0.0011
Supervisor on-the-
job training as flow  (2.32)  (2.52)  (0.65)   (-0.36)  
 
0.002 *** 0.0006 0.0016 0.0009  0.0028 *** 0.0010  0.0001  0.0016
Peer on-the-job 
training as stock (3.52) (1.67) (2.85) (0.03)
 
0.001 0.0006 0.0009 0.0008  0.0009  0.0010  -0.0024  0.0015
Peer on-the-job 
training as flow 
 
(0.47)  (1.03)  (0.91)   (-1.65)  
Constant 1.021 0.0010 0.8847 0.0022  1.0062 0.0013 1.1692 0.0021
Number of obs. 11,788 2,824 4,120 3,417 
Number of groups 3,274 761 1,142 916 
 
Note: * Significant at 0.10, ** at 0.05, *** at 0.01. 
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Calculating Returns on Investment (ROI) 
Shaving fractions of seconds off of phone calls may appear to have a very modest effect 
on productivity.  However, in call centers that manage millions of transactions in a typical year, 
shaving off these fractions translates into millions of dollars in savings.  To assess the costs and 
benefits of training in this case, we calculated the return on investment by using employee wage 
records and the estimated coefficients of OJT_STK on call handling time, as shown in Tables 2 
and 4.  Unlike Bishop (1991) who only accounts for the training time of trainers, we also take 
into account the training time of workers.  For a typical worker in our study, the average call 
handling time was 21.67 seconds per call prior to training.  Each additional hour of on-the-job 
training was associated with a 0.05 second reduction in time per call.  The average annual 
earnings for telephone operators, service assistants, and supervisors were $33,171, $39,811, 
and $59,328, respectively. Viewing the dollar value of operator labor savings as benefits and the 
dollar value of trainees’ and trainers’ time devoted to instructive activities as costs, the 
company’s investments in training have economic pay offs when the monthly rate of human 
capital loss of the workforce, including skill depreciation, worker turnover, and retirement, is less 
than 20%.  We also used three alternative conditions to estimate ROI: (1) human capital does 
not decrease; (2) human capital decreases at the rate of 5% per month; and (3) human capital 
decreases at the rate of 10 % per month.  The results (and formula used to calculate these 
results) are shown in Table 6.  Assuming that operators work seven hours per workday and 4.3 
weeks per month, ROI is 318% at a monthly human capital loss rate of 5%.  Thus, the returns to 
company investment in on-the-job training are quite high.  
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Table 6 
Rates of Return to Training 
 
 
All Workers 
 
Low 
proficiency 
Average 
proficiency 
High 
proficiency Monthly rate of human 
capital loss 
firstyearROI  totalROI  totalROI  totalROI  totalROI  
0% 250.6% 
Very 
large  Very large Very large Very large 
5% 192.0% 317.8%  545.3% 92.2% 75.7% 
10% 149.9% 108.9%  222.7% -3.9% -12.2% 
 
 
Notes: Calculation of returns on investments are based on  
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where  is the average wage of operators, is the average wage of trainers,  refers to labor 
savings due to one-hour training in the first month, and 
oW tW 0Sη is the month rate of human capital loss. 
 
 
Discussion  
This study focused on the relationship between on-the-job training and productivity among 
incumbent telephone operators in a large unionized telecommunications company.  Using 
objective data from company archives and a fixed effects model to control for worker 
heterogeneity, our analyses produced three major findings.  First, we found a significant positive 
relationship between investments in on-the-job training and productivity; and the benefits of 
training were sustained over several months.  Because our specification takes into account both 
the stock and flow of training investments, and the lag between investments and benefits, we 
were able to provide a more fine-grained estimation of the returns to training.  
Second, our results indicate that individual differences, as measured by pre-training 
proficiency, need to be incorporated into evaluations of training effectiveness, both because 
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they affect the returns to training and because they interact with the type of training offered.  
Given amount of training, less proficient employees made greater performance gains than did 
more proficient workers, suggesting that information processing and self-regulatory mechanisms 
are different among workers with different levels of initial job competence.  In addition, less 
proficient workers benefited more from training with supervisors than with peers, while the 
opposite was true for more able workers.  This difference is understandable as supervisors tend 
to provide structured training on basic procedures while peer trainers draw on their tacit 
knowledge of idiosyncratic work processes to enhance the existing knowledge of experienced 
workers.  These findings are consistent with the literature on situated learning, which suggests 
that on-the-job learning depends not only on the attributes of individuals, but on the interactions 
among employees at work.   
Finally, this quantitative case study demonstrates that companies may recoup their 
investments in training, even in settings characterized by highly routinized work.  Based on this 
sample of telephone operators, we estimated a 318% return on investment, under the 
assumption that human capital decreases 5% per month. As Kusterer (1978) noted, no job is 
literally unskilled and all jobs require the acquisition of a substantial amount of working 
knowledge in job-specific domains.  On-the-job training is an effective tool for high-school 
educated workers to upgrade skills and enhance job competence.  Moreover, in contrast to 
formal training, which tends to be concentrated among young, well-educated, professional or 
managerial employees, or those in large establishments, on-the-job training is widespread  and 
worker characteristics (such as sex, race, and even formal education) do not appear to have a 
significant influence on the receipt of on-the-job training (Altonji and Spletzer 1991).  Therefore, 
it provides a valuable learning opportunity for workers who do not go on to college or who 
cannot afford to devote a lengthy amount of time to certificated programs.  
There are several limitations to this study, however.  First, to deal with the issue of 
selection bias, we examined the association between worker characteristics and on-the-job 
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training, which demonstrates a pattern of negative selection into training. Workers who received 
low performance ratings appeared to receive greater amounts of on-the-job training. That 
suggests that our estimation of training effects is downward biased and tends to be 
conservative. Moreover, we included pre-training proficiency levels in our models and used fixed 
effects estimation.  These strategies alleviate, although do not completely solve, this problem.  
Second, we do not allow for time-variant individual heterogeneity in this study.  Nevertheless, 
the results suggest that our models explain more than 93% of total variance.   Third, we 
examine only proximal productivity outcomes.  While labor efficiency is clearly a high priority in 
this commodity production setting, managers were also very concerned about customer 
satisfaction ratings and employee behaviors such as absenteeism.  In such routinized jobs, time 
off the phone for training is viewed as a benefit, with motivational results that may reduce 
emotional exhaustion or burnout and absenteeism, and in turn generate better service by 
employees or additional cost savings. 
 Finally, the important question is, ‘so what?’  The present study examines a setting in 
which work tasks have been increasingly automated and employment levels have fallen steadily 
over the last 50 years.  If employer strategies emphasize investment in labor-saving technology, 
why bother with training?  Moreover, the current study also takes place in a unionized setting, in 
which turnover rates are low, so the employer can be certain to reclaim investments in training.  
What about the typical service workplace in which turnover rates are 30 to 100 percent 
annually?   
We believe that the answer to the first question is that firms need to maximize the 
productivity of existing processes even as they continue to seek new levels of efficiency through 
automation; and with on-going changes in software technology and information systems, 
employees need on-going training to adjust to those changes.   In addition, as Levy and 
Murnane and others have demonstrated, the jobs left behind are typically more complex than 
those that have been automated, requiring higher skills and job-specific training.  If this study is 
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viewed as a critical test – a setting in which the pay-offs to training are not likely to be found -- 
then we believe the findings may generalize to a broader set of employees whose skills require 
regular on-the-job upgrading due to on-going changes in products, marketing, work processes, 
and technologies.  A large proportion of U.S. workplaces falls into this category; and compared 
to directory assistance services, involve jobs that offer employees greater opportunity and 
discretion to use their skills and knowledge.  In these contexts, the pay-off to systematic on-the-
job training should be greater than that found in our study. 
The second question is more problematic.  Over the last decade, employers have 
increasingly embraced market-mediated contracts, with low commitment to long term 
employment relations.  To the extent that they continue to rely on a high turnover model of 
employment, then they may have little incentive to invest in job-related training, even among 
relatively high skilled employees.  In this sense, the decision to invest in training is part of a 
broader set of policy decisions regarding which type of work and employment system employers 
choose to embrace.  Particularly for employers in price conscious service and sales markets, 
the incentives to compete on the basis of high turnover employment models may continue to 
dominate the landscape.  However, given that U.S. employers actually do invest substantially in 
on-the-job training, this research suggests that paying attention to how it is actually carried out 
may yield positive benefits that outweigh the costs.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Worker Characteristics and Total Training Hours Received in Five Months 
 
 Coef. P>|t| 
Performance ratings prior to training -0.8849 0.00 
Age 0.0023 0.75 
Organizational tenure -0.0058 0.49 
Sex -0.2963 0.09 
Race 0.3399 0.05 
Constant 7.6623 0.00 
R-squared 57.71%
Adjusted R-Squared 54.90%
 
Note: 1. * Significant at 0.10, ** at 0.05, *** at 0.01. 
          2. Number of observations =2360 
3. Sex: dummy variable for male=0, female=1. 
          4. Race: dummy variable for race with white=0 and nonwhite=1 
          5. Supervisors (143 in total) were considered as dummy variables in the regression. 
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